Brünnhilde’s Lament: The Mourning Play of the Gods
Reading Wagner’s Musical Dramas with Benjamin’s Theory of Music

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It was Brünnhilde’s long, final song in the last scene of Götterdämmerung, in Achim Freyer’s and James Conlon’s Los Angeles Ring cycle of 2010, that prompted me to consider possible correspondences between tragedy and musical drama and, in addition, to ask how recognizing such correspondences affects the commonplace derivation of musical drama from myth¹ or Greek tragedy² and tying Wagner to Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. The impression I had gained from Linda Watson’s rendition of the song did not fit a reading in terms of apotheosis: the way the downfall of the world of the gods is usually staged, when, at the end of the cycle, Brünnhilde kindles the conflagration and follows murdered Siegfried into death. It seemed to me much more that what we heard was a long-extended lament.

This performance did not seem to match the prevailing characterization of the scene as “solid and solemn” (fest und feierlich), as Peter Wapnewski has put it, speaking of an “apotheotic finale” and a “solemn-pathetic accusation.” In his words, “Now Brünnhilde sings forth the end. In the powerful scene of lonely grandeur that demands the singer-actress’s dramatic power to their limits—and beyond.”³ In Freyer’s and Conlon’s Götterdämmerung, tones of lament rather than the pathos of accusation could be heard in Brünnhilde’s final song. It seemed that the verse “Hear my lament, / you august god” (act 3, scene 3) had been extended into an entire dirge; that this time the Ring cycle itself was dying out with Brünnhilde’s lament. In listening to this, a sentence by the young Walter Benjamin came into my mind, namely: “The mourning play . . . describes the path from natural sound via lament to music” (Selected Writings, 1:60).⁴ And just afterward it occurred to me that Benjamin’s book On the Origin of German Mourning Plays⁵ contains a section on opera—a section that has been neglected along with Benjamin’s musical theory in general.⁶

The Passage de l’Opéra in the Book on Mourning Plays
In this short passage from Benjamin’s study—it takes up roughly two pages—he approaches opera from two differing perspectives that intersect like two lines. One line follows the history of genre, the “dissolution of the Trauerspiel into opera” at the
end of the Baroque period (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 12), while a second line is concerned, in a much more fundamental way, with music in its relationship to signification. The first line, within which individual elements of mourning plays are characterized as “operatic,” describes the transition from such drama to opera. For example: “Also pressing toward opera was the musical overture, which preceded the play for Jesuits and Protestants.” Hence the historical transition to opera was accompanied by dissolution of the mourning play. Thus far, Benjamin’s schema corresponds to the familiar narrative. And while in the chapter on “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” he criticizes Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy on account of its “eschewal of a historico-philosophical perception of myth” under the spell of a “Wagnerian metaphysics” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 102), he here invokes The Birth of Tragedy. At this point the name Wagner briefly surfaces: Nietzsche, Benjamin observes, contrasted “Wagner’s ‘tragic’ Gesamtkunstwerk with the playful opera, whose emergence was being prepared in the Baroque.” To the latter Wagner “threw down the gauntlet with his condemnation of recitative” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 212). However brief the comment is, it is a remarkable statement. For whereas Benjamin here follows Nietzsche’s juxtaposition between Wagner and the opera, he simultaneously distances himself, through the use of quotation marks, from Nietzsche’s concept of the tragic, thus signaling he does not view Wagner as belonging under the tragic rubric. But as regards Nietzsche’s consent with Wagner’s critique of the opera emerging from the Baroque, Benjamin emphasizes especially Nietzsche’s rejection of recitative and his critique of it as a sort of rediscovered language of the primordial man (Urmensch) within an idyllic land of pastorals (Schäferspiele).

With Nietzsche himself, the critical view of opera not only involves Baroque opera but, even more so, the inception of the history of opera in the late sixteenth century—he views the genre as an invention of an artistically impotent type of person lacking Dionysian depth. That person had, Benjamin writes, citing Nietzsche, transformed “the enjoyment of music into a rational [verstandesmäßig] verbal and tonal rhetoric of passion in the stile rappresentativo and into a lust [Wollust] of the singing arts.” Following the citation with no paragraph break marking transition, Benjamin characterizes the opera as a product of the decay of the mourning play. In so doing, he focuses on a different primal scene as the opera’s emergence as a form: something generally traced back to a misunderstanding that informed the efforts to rediscover antique tragedy within the late sixteenth century Florentine Camerata: their riforma melodramatica unfolding under the assumption that both the Greeks and Romans “fully sang” their tragedies. Benjamin, in contrast, shifts the scene of his critique away from both Athens and Florence toward the north—toward the German Baroque.

This displacement is grounded in the genuine point of view of this book: that of literature and the mourning play. He thus considers the comparison with tragedy
as inadequate for understanding opera; it is obvious, he instead argues, that “from the point of view of literature, and especially the mourning play, opera must appear to be a product of decay” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 212). This perspective is aligned, we should note, with that of Richard Wagner’s essay “Opera and Drama,” written in 1852, a text that Benjamin very likely did not know. In its first part, while Wagner does not criticize opera as a “product of decay,” he does criticize the decline of opera from the perspective of literature: the decline sets in when and to the extent that literature is degraded to a “merely auxiliary poetic art.” In the place of Nietzsche’s birth of tragedy from music, Benjamin’s discussion of opera is thus concerned with the emergence of opera from the mourning play, his focus being on the disappearance of two interconnected phenomena: namely, the disappearance of “inhibition of signification” and the disappearance of mourning constitute the transition from mourning play to opera and consign the latter to, in the end, a realm of the banal, in the unresisting unfolding of operatic fable and operatic language. “The self-indulgent delight in sheer sound,” Benjamin thus explains, itself “played its part in the decline of the Trauerspiel” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 213). With inhibition (Hemmung) and mourning (Trauer), Benjamin is returning to two themes in his early music theory that I will need to come back to later.

The opposition between the inhibition of signification in the mourning play and the unresisting unfolding of fable and language in opera again takes up the second line of argument, beyond the history of genres with which the first section begins. The passage on opera in Benjamin’s book on the mourning play opens by discussing a phonetic tension in seventeenth-century language, a tension emerging from the separation of sound from meaning—the core motif of allegory’s structure. Benjamin analyzes this primarily for pictorial allegory, calling it an “abyss between visual being and meaning” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 165; translation modified). What is involved in his discussion of opera is simply the corresponding phenomenon in the field of sound. In the phonetic realm, we read in the incisive overture of Benjamin’s opera passage that tension leads “directly to music,” which is thus introduced as “the adversary of meaning-laden speech” (211). Music thus comes into play as a counter-pole to meaning in the phonetic sphere, as a mode of expression in which meaning dissolves, expires, or fails.

The outcome of these two argumentative lines is that sound and music receive a twofold, counter-moving assessment: on one hand as the voluptuary pleasure in pure sound through which operatic action and speech unfold and that thus deflates the work’s dramatic structure; on the other hand as music representing the adversary to meaning in the sphere of tones. To this extent Benjamin’s thesis of decline is followed by a weighty but: “But, nonetheless, music—by virtue of its own character rather than the favour of the authors—is something with which the allegorical drama is intimately familiar” (213). Hence, where from the viewpoint of generic history opera represents a product of the decay of the mourning play, in the
tensions between sound and meaning Benjamin recognized a deeper affinity between the mourning play and music. His alternatives to the comparison of genres thus culminate in an inner affinity between music and allegorical drama: a affinity of character, not genre. Attributes of this affinity are inhibition and mourning.

The two lines I have outlined here, generic history and a kind of musical ontology, intersect in the motif of “passion for the organic” that Benjamin identifies as a sign of the Baroque, a symptom of a flight from the world, of being addicted to nature (Naturverfallenheit) and an anti-historical stance in the Baroque’s Schädelstätte (site of skulls). In Benjamin’s words, “The ‘passion for the organic,’ which has long had a place in the discussion of the visual art of the baroque, is not so easy to describe in the realm of literature” (211). The task formulated here gains its weight from the explanation that it involves not so much external form as inner organic spaces. If the voice is then brought into play as the “organic moment of poetry [Dichtung],” it by no means serves, in the process, as a representative or embodiment of the organic. Rather, it is the voice that issues from the interior spaces. It is the expression of a sphere into which we cannot penetrate or gaze, but from which something emerges. If we want to learn more about the voice’s role as expression of feeling and vehicle of the word, if we want to learn more about the remarkable role inhibition plays for mourning, then we need to pay attention to Benjamin’s dedication at the start of his book: “Conceived 1916, Written 1925” (25). But first I would like to consider the question of the relationship between the mourning play, opera, and musical drama.

The Mourning Play of the Gods

This relationship becomes tangible, I would like to argue, in some features of Wagner’s musical drama. The Ring cycle is generally interpreted as mythic drama, the ring itself not only as an object of desire quarreled over by the gods, night goblins, and giants but also as a symbol of cyclical time, which extends into the drama itself. Achim Freyer, who is used to developing his productions from the stage’s space, has staged this structure as a counterplay of circular stage and timeline within an impressive pictorial space. As Carl Dahlhaus has observed, when it comes to the Ring cycle’s dramatic-musical structure, the mythic prehistory of the events constitutes a precondition for Wagner’s mnemonic themes and leitmotifs; and this as a “musically represented myth that has been brought to speak,” and that finds its expression in a “return to the language of feeling.” Importantly, in distinction to the popular opera and the trivial formula of “music as the language of feeling,” the emotions are by no means directly expressed in the singing; rather, a mesh of musical commentaries is woven over the dramatic action.11 Hence, if we discover the Ring cycle’s conception in the interstices between the work’s dramatic dynamic and its music, then Wagner’s musical drama is located precisely where Benjamin places the mourning play—at the point of transition between the time of drama and the time of music.
But within the horizon of a relationship with the mourning play, the *Ring*’s dramatic structure appears in another light, as that of, for instance, a “double drama” of *myth* of the gods and *drama* of heroes. Dahlhaus holds this responsible for a series of dramatic discrepancies between affective expression and action; his analysis of what he terms the “drama’s formal laws” draws on Aristotelian poetics, musical drama thus placed in the tradition of tragedy. In contrast, I would argue that the events of the *Ring* cycle more cogently represent a drama of gods and heroes. For in this drama, gods, human beings, and various intermediate beings act on the same site, where the demarcating line between the world of the gods and that of mortals has become permeable. This has occurred not only because the gods join with human beings and produce children (Wotan as the father of Sieglinde and Siegmund), as we are familiar with from mythology, and not only because mortal heroes fight with the gods (as Siegfried with “wanderer” Wotan); but beyond this some figures change their affiliation—first of all, Brünnhilde, when her divinity is taken away from her: “For thus the God / departs from you, / thus he kisses your godhead away!” (*Die Walküre*, act 3, scene 3). Patrice Chéreau, who is used to shaping his stagings from iconography, has presented this scene in the image of a Pietà inverted in every respect: the divine father holds his half-divine, half-human daughter in his arms.

Brünnhilde’s status as a threshold being is emphasized through repeated scenes of awakening: similar to the case with her mother Erda, who disposes over the world’s dream knowledge, and similar to the case of her later sister Kundry in *Parsifal*, who alternately awakens in the world of the Grail and in Klingsor’s counterworld and intermittently sinks into a death-like sleep. In addition to the biblical meaning of knowing her in the scene in which Siegfried awakes Brünnhilde from her timeless sleep in the ring of fire, her waking is described as a threshold between different modes of knowledge—just as Benjamin describes the awakening as located at a threshold between mutually exclusive states of consciousness, and as a “paradigm of dialectical thinking” (*Selected Writings*, 43). For in the moment of awakening as a woman, Brünnhilde loses both her knowledge and abilities of a Valkyrie (*Siegfried*, act 3, scene 3). In Wagner’s musical dramas, gods become human beings and the fool a mortal god. In *Parsifal* as well, we encounter hybrid beings between the divine and the human; here the Grail king Amfortas and his father, Titurel, appear as gods whose superhuman status has to be retained through constant ritual service; for this reason, when Titurel’s son fails to do his sacred duty to the Grail, Titurel has to die, “a man, like everyone” (act 3). And in the case of Parsifal himself, his metamorphosis takes place in the form of a shock-like perception, when through Kundry’s kiss the fool’s ear is instantly opened to the “divine lament” of Amfortas and he momentarily places himself in Amfortas’s stead, similar to the “as if” transposition into another person’s suffering, as empathy is often circumscribed: “We conceive ourselves enduring all the torments, we enter as it were into his body,” as Adam Smith described pity. Through Kundry’s kiss, Parsifal becomes an as-if Amfortas and instantly feels his pain.
By contrast, the tragic element of ancient Greek drama is grounded in the human hero’s attempting to evade the fate laid on him by the gods, thus taking his fate into his own hands and only thereby bringing about his tragic end; the constellation characteristic of tragedy is inverted in Wagner’s Ring. Here the musical drama is no scene of agonistic struggle between divine advice and human action; but rather the gods themselves are subject to fate and entangled in a conflict of commitments they themselves have created. But in that the gods inherit the fate of tragic heroes, they become sad figures. Their actions have qualities evoking the Janus face characteristic of the sovereign in the Baroque mourning play, endowed with superhuman power yet driven by creaturely emotions. Benjamin’s characterization of the Baroque sovereign as a “lunatic autocrat” and “emblem of the unhinged Creation” who, precisely because he is incapable to make decisions, becomes a tyrant and destroys “himself and his entire court” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 70) in an explosion of his passions, quite accurately describes the figure of Wotan. In the Trauerspiel the sovereign is swept up in a fall he himself has brought about, as does Wotan in the Ring, a musical drama that in any event presents itself in long stretches as a mourning play of the gods. One need only recall the sorry sight presented in Parsifal of the Grail community, in dire straits because Amfortas refuses his holy office, for which reason many stagings—most recently, François Girard’s 2013 production in New York—set the third act in a visibly desolate surrounding. Another deplorable picture comes to mind: that of the suddenly anemic and fading Wotan clan in Das Rheingold after the giants abduct the goddess Freia, dispenser of eternal youth. Chéreau has impressively staged this scene using the iconography of Pieter Breughel’s The Blind Leading the Blind, the figures of the divine clan sinking to the ground, holding each other’s hands. If here the divine world itself becomes a mourning play, then it is precisely in the double sense of the word that Benjamin elaborated: the Trauerspiel as, on one hand, a dramatic play of mourning, lament, and absent salvation, and, on the other hand, the world’s condition in which those involved perceive themselves.

But as I have pointed out, the question of the musical drama’s relationship to the mourning play is not limited to considerations of generic theory, and instead fundamentally addresses the relationship between feeling, language, and music. This is where lament takes center stage. It is the leitmotif of Benjamin’s book on the mourning play, and it marks the juxtaposition with tragedy. As Benjamin puts it, “In truth, the chorus of tragedy is not lamenting” (121). This assessment is already solidly grounded in the verbal enormity displayed by the tragic Greek chorus, which, Benjamin observes, “remains sovereign in the face of deep suffering; this contradicts lamenting devotion.” The sovereignty of the chorus is grounded in neither impassiveness nor in pity. Rather, Benjamin characterizes it as an effect of bound language, as the choric restoration of the ruins of tragic dialogue into a firm verbal structure. The chorus’s presence, Benjamin insists, in no way dissolves the tragic events into
lamenting but places limits on the affects. Yet, he underscores, the “conception of the chorus as a ‘lament of mourning’ in which ‘the original pain of creation resounds’” is “a genuine Baroque reinterpretation of its nature.”

In Benjamin’s writing the figure of lament (Klage) is illuminated not least through its tension with a profane counterpart, the accusation (Anklage) addressed to worldly institutions. The figure also shows clear differences from both pity and the state of being stirred or moved. Benjamin criticizes the latter, Rührung, in his famous essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, for example, in reference to Goethe’s phrasing of the “divine worth of tones and tears” in his “Elegy”: “Tearful lament: that is Rührung.” For Benjamin, lament is a figure on the threshold of feeling and language, at the moment when signification emerges and also dissolves, as in expressions like “ai,” “ach,” or “oh.” In his following texts—at the juncture of his theoretical reflections on language and on history—this figure will repeatedly take a prominent place. Since lament and the god’s sadness play a prominent role in Wagner’s musical dramas, it is particularly through these expressive forms that Wagner’s plays depart from the tradition of tragedy and the tragic, instead displaying elements of the mourning play.

An additional tie between the Ring cycle and the Baroque Trauerspiel is the propensity for allegory, both in the sense of musical allegory—the way motifs such as day and death in Tristan and Isolde have been characterized—and in that of the musical expression of personified affects in the Ring. There also individual figures are interpreted as allegories, first and foremost Brünnhilde und Fricka, presented as embodiments of opposing directions in Wotan’s will and wishes. This becomes clear in the dramatically dynamic central part of Die Walküre, in Wotan’s confrontation, initially, with Fricka (act 2, scene 1): appearing as Wotan’s conscience, she demands that he put aside his plan for a hero freed from the gods’ law, since such a hero could after all complete his work only with Wotan’s protection and the help of Wotan’s magic. Fricka is here simply pronouncing what Wotan “himself secretly knew, without admitting it to himself.” The allegorical constellation is also clear in the following confrontation with Brünnhilde (act 2, scene 2), appearing as an embodiment of Wotan’s will—“You are speaking to Wotan’s will,” she tells him—but a will he now revokes, so that his earlier will, embodied in Brünnhilde, has separated itself from him and now turns against him. In general the personae in Götterdämmerung are not characters, rather resembling, to cite Dahlhaus, “stages of emotion breaking over the soul from the outside and spreading itself out over it in unrestrained fashion—unbroken through character.” Francis Fergusson could thus speak of “action as passion” in reference to Wagner. It is not the case here that actor-singers represent emotions; rather, the action itself is passion.

Given how close to Benjamin’s observations about the Baroque mourning play Wagner’s operas are, it is remarkable that Wagner himself only plays a small role in Benjamin’s writing. Symptomatic, rather, is a mediated position of Wagner in
Benjamin’s work, above all by way of Nietzsche, Baudelaire, and Adorno. Most remarkable is his intensive engagement with Adorno’s Wagner essay of 1939 in a letter to Adorno of June 19, 1938, in which Benjamin above all critically comments on the discrepancy between polemics and rescue. In our context, two statements from the letter are interesting. Benjamin’s thesis of the affinity between musical form and that literary form which corresponds to the philosophical tendency toward rescue echoes his earlier reflections on musical dissolution, namely the dissolution (Auflösung) of lament into music instead of salvation (Erlösung). I will come back to this later. The other statement is to the effect that the social-critical and technical reflections in Adorno’s essay negated other old and important themes in his musical theory: namely, “opera as solace” and “music as objection.” (Gesammelte Briefe, 6:123, transl. mine). This is tied directly to Adorno’s argument that in Wagner’s music the motif of opera as solace (Trost) has been lost; but also indirectly to the leitmotif of desolation (Trostlosigkeit) in Benjamin’s book on the mourning play.

From the absence of all eschatology, what follows is, Benjamin indicates, “the attempt to find consolation through the renunciation of a state of grace in a regression to the bare state of Creation.” This is what Benjamin addresses thematically as a “secularization of the historical in the state of Creation.” In the Baroque mourning play it is not eternity that stands opposed to the desolate course of the world chronicle, “but the restoration of the timelessness of paradise. History wanders into the scene” (92; transl. mine). If in this way both lament and the world’s lack of solace in the Trauerspiel stand opposed to the opera’s solace, then Wagner’s turn against opera in his musical drama does not simply lead back to the Trauerspiel. What we hear in musical drama is not the lament of the creaturely but another lament. It is that of the gods themselves, and of those cut off from return to the state of Creation, because they have entered into a conflict with the will and laws of the gods. Hence it would appear that the afterlife of the Trauerspiel in the musical drama indeed moves along lines set by the lament. But it also brings along various reversals of the Baroque signature.

It is now time to take a closer look at the significance of the lament in Benjamin’s musical theory.

From Natural Sound via Lament to Music

The same year in which Benjamin indicates he drafted his Trauerspiel book, 1916, was also the year in which he wrote two small essays, one entitled “The Mourning Play and Tragedy” (“Trauerspiel und Tragödie”), the other “The Significance of Language in the Mourning Play and Tragedy” (“Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie”). In these texts, which represent both the origin and monad of the book on mourning plays, music plays an important role. They are also the source of
the previously cited sentence about the origins of music in lament, or, more precisely the statement that the “word in transformation” describes a path “from natural sound via lament to music” (Selected Writings, 1:60). With this thesis, young Benjamin found himself in clear (albeit tacit) opposition to Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872). As is well known, Nietzsche’s starting point is a conflict between Dionysian-ecstatic and Apollonian elements in ancient Greek culture. He derives the origins of tragedy from the Dionysian dithyrambs, from song, dance, and music, and sees their transformation into artistic form as occurring when the chorus, emerging from “Dionysian music,” is supplemented with the “Apollonian portion” of the dialogue. In distinction to the Dionysian–Apollonian opposition, the starting point for the young Benjamin is that between mourning and the tragic. He considers tragedy—this clearly following Friedrich Hölderlin’s notes to his Sophocles translations—above all as a form structured by dialogue and the law of the spoken word. He thus neither refers to the Dionysian cults or “goat songs” nor derives his thesis of the birth of music from lament from the song of Orpheus, which indeed stems from the dirge. And in distinction to the later book on the mourning play, he here does not consider generic history. Rather than establishing distinctions of genre, both texts are concerned with the opposing temporal structures and different modes of expression in the “tragic” and “sad” in general.

The text on “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” is mainly concerned with time and reflects—against the backdrop of the distinction between historical and messianic time—on the two dramatic forms from a historical-philosophical perspective. Where Benjamin sees a close connection of tragedy to historical time and describes it as a closed form, he characterizes the mourning play, in contrast, as a form that has not been completed. The mourning play is structured by the law of repetition and “the idea of its dissolution” no longer plays itself out “within the dramatic realm.” In the essay’s final passage, we read as follows: “And this is the point where—from the analysis of form—the difference between mourning play and tragedy decisively emerges. The rest of the mourning play is music.” And further: “Perhaps similar to tragedy that marks the transition from historical to dramatic time, the mourning play is positioned at the transition from dramatic time to musical time” (57; transl. mine).

This introduces the theme of the second essay, on “The Significance of Language in the Mourning Play and Tragedy.” Its final sentence captures the difference between tragedy and mourning play in the succinct opposition between the rigidity of the spoken word in tragedy and the endless resonance of sound in the mourning play. This explains the later thesis, formulated in the Trauerspiel book, of the relationship between the mourning play and music. But the short text from 1916 starts with another question—with the riddle of the Trauerspiel, namely, “How language in general can be filled with mourning and be an expression of mourning . . . how mourning can gain entry into the linguistic order of art” (60). Benjamin explores this
riddle with a view to a form of existence of words distinct from their function as bearers of meaning, discovering it in the “word in transformation.” He characterizes this as the verbal principle of the Trauerspiel, in this manner discovering in the word something like an emotion-endowed being:

There is a pure affective life of the word, in which it refines itself by developing from the sound of nature to the pure sound of feeling. For this word, language is merely a transitional phase in the cycle of its transformation, and in this word the mourning play speaks. It describes the path from natural sound via lament to music. In the mourning play, sound lays itself apart symphonically; this is simultaneously the musical principle of its language and the dramatic principle of its divisiveness and splitting into persona. (60; transl. mine; italics mine)²³

In this manner the entry of feeling, especially of mourning, into the order of language brings the relationship between sound and meaning in motion; mourning breaks, as it were, into language, at the same time breaking apart the unity of word and sense, sound and meaning. At this point Benjamin deploys the remarkable image of symphonic separation, a chiastic figure. The sym-phonic—that is, “together sounding”—separation characterizes the musical principle of language in the mourning play. The figure corresponds to the structure of that play, in which Benjamin sees two principles at work: on one hand a conflict, sundering semantic unity, between the two verbal dimensions of word and meaning; on the other hand a circle of feeling that closes in music: “Cycle and repetition, circle and duality. For it is the circle of feeling that closes in music, and it is the duality of the word and its meaning that destroys the tranquility of a profound yearning and spreads sorrow throughout nature” (60; transl. mine).

The closing passage concentrates Benjamin’s argument concerning the acoustic quality of music: “Indeed, in the end everything comes down to the ear of the lament, for only the deepest received and heard lament [vernommene und gehörte Klage] becomes music.” And further: “Whereas in tragedy the eternal rigidity of the spoken word is exalted, the mourning play gathers together the infinite resonance of its sound” (140; transl. mine).²⁴ Thus it is through the lament that Benjamin’s reflections turn to the ear and what is heard. This corresponds to the emphasis in his essay on language on a receptive, gathering stance, at the point where he refers to Adamitic language as a translation of the mute language of nature and things into the verbal language of human beings. But here, in his reflections on the birth of music from lament, lament and sound, Klage and Klang, are connected in the closest possible way. Lament is a threshold phenomenon: as sounds it extends into the world of music; as language it refers to the creaturely and the realm of Creation.

But importantly, in this side piece to the linguistic theory Benjamin formulated that same year, he was not trying to outline how in music the emotions might be transcended. Rather, in the discussion following the turn “from natural sound via
lament to music,” we find an accumulation of concepts having to do with inhibition, hesitation, and congestion. They characterize a rhythm developing from the opposition between affective expression and linguistic content. We see this, for instance, when Benjamin observes that an inhibition emerges in the movement along the path from natural sound to affective sound: “Midway along this path, nature finds itself betrayed by language, and that enormous restraint of emotion becomes mourning” (60; transl. mine). And we see it when he writes of an enormous congestion of emotions from which suddenly a “new world emerges in the word, namely the world of meaning.” And further: “Mourning fills the sensuous world in which nature and language meet” (60; transl. mine). Hence mourning is here an effect emerging from the conflict between nature and the signifi- catory side of language. One could say that the desire to express emotion in language is necessarily frustrated in face of “actual language” and its constitution as a signifi- catory system, because there exists no clear-cut correspondence. There remains always a certain inadequacy, if not an abyss, in the relationship between the desire of expression and language, between emotion and word. The “restraint of emotion” Benjamin describes as the grounds of mourning emerges from this rhythm of expression and failure. And it is precisely at this point that music comes into play.

In his reading of that dramatic form by way of his theory of expression, Benjamin replaces the idea of salvation (Erlösung)—necessary within the Christian logic of the Trauerspiel—with the figure of dissolution (Auflösung): a dissolving of the tension of emotion, and also of the tension between the opposing forces of word and meaning and thus operating as both dissolving and salvational at once. “The mourning play,” he writes, “does not rest on the foundation of actual language but on a consciousness of the unity that language achieves through emotion, a unity unfolding in words. In the midst of this unfolding, the errant emotion raises the lament of sorrow. But this lament must dissolve itself [sich auflösen]; on the basis of just that presupposed unity, it transitions into the language of pure emotion, into music” (61; transl. mine).

The position of the mourning play at the transitional point between the time of drama and the time of music is thus delineated as a rhythmic model: as a verbal-affective rhythm of expression, inhibition, and dissolution that shifts into music, “from natural sound via lament to music.” In this way, Benjamin transfers the idea of salvation—upon which rests the reference of the Christian mourning play to religiously conceived transcendence—into an economy and dynamics of emotions: as affective tension, inhibition, and dissolution culminating in music. In the afterlife of a Christian-transmitted affective culture in Benjamin’s theory of music, the figure of Auflösung has replaced Erlösung—a kind of salvation from salvation in music and a fascinating response to the emblematic enigmatic phrase “Erlösung dem Erlöser” (salvation of the savior) in Wagner’s Parsifal. It is a response that also
resonates in the characterization of Wagner as a “master of transition” in Adorno’s commentaries to the score of *Parsifal*, where he describes a composed aura of the musical ideas of the *Parsifal* style “that does not evolve in the moment of performance but rather in that of fading away.”

In distinction to Aristotelian catharsis and the tradition of an affect-theoretical discussion of drama based on it, the focus here is not on fellow feeling with the protagonists (referring to *eleos* and *phobos*, usually translated as pity and terror). Nor is it on purification of feelings affected by the dramatic events. Rather tension, inhibition, and dissolution of the emotions are discussed along the path of emotions itself, in the medium of a verbal expressive form that transitions into music. Benjamin’s musical theory is also at a remove from the Romantic topos of music as language in that here music emerges precisely from the failed effort to verbalize feelings.

**The Lament in Musical Drama**

Wagner’s musical drama can be very well described with Benjamin’s figure of “symphonisches Auseinandertreten” (symphonic moving apart), as can the relationship between language and music, song and orchestra, within it. It is a legend, as Dahlhaus has argued, that in Wagner “the music or even the drama is transcended in the ‘orchestral symphony.’” Text and music not only enjoy equal rights but also even behave “intermittently,” interrupting each other. The artist Wagner here stands opposed to the increasing sacralization of art that the author and ideologue Wagner was propounding. For although in his late text on “Religion and Art” (1880) Wagner waxes on about the restoration of a true religion through music, about overcoming the split between concept and feeling, and about “symphonic revelations,” entirely different notes are sounded in his musical dramas: whether in the distance between voices and orchestra, in the way the leitmotifs intrude into the songs, in the relationship between diatonicism and chromaticism, consonance and dissonance, or in the expressive character “of the unresolved dissonance of the Tristan style.” In this way, in Wagner’s work the allegorical abyss between meaning and sound and the rhythm of inhibition and dissolution receive a concrete musical sense. Often perceived as disconcerting, the language of this musical drama also plays a role in its affinity with the mourning play. When, for example, Nietzsche captures his feeling on reading *Parsifal* in 1878 in the statement that the work’s “language sounds like a translation from an alien tongue,” then his observation about the echo of a foreign language in one’s own brings to mind an insight of Benjamin’s: that every translation can be considered a test of the distance of what is hidden from revelation within the particular languages—a distance increasing alongside the proliferation of languages. But at the center of the relationship between mourning play and musical drama stands the lament.
It would be rewarding to systematically explore the expressive forms of mourning and the countless, highly varied scenes of lament in Wagner’s musical dramas. Such an exploration would have to dwell on Lohengrin, for instance, where we encounter Elsa’s “sound full of lament / that grew into tremendous sounds / as it echoed through the airs” (act 1, scene 2). In Parsifal we find Kundry’s “howl of lament,” her Klagegeheul (this the stage direction at the start of act 2); the lament of the flower girls in Klingsor’s realm, their “Weh, ach wehe” over their beloved knights, slain by the sword of foolish Parsifal; and above all naturally the lament of the Grail king Amfortas. In his Bayreuth staging, Stefan Herheim brings out how this lament at first turns into self-pity and then into an aggressive demand for pity, until finally, since help through human pity seems lacking, Amfortas appeals to the Savior himself to be redeemed from his earthly savior’s office: “Release me from my heritage, / close my wound, / that holy I may die” (act 1). In the Ring cycle, we encounter the “god’s distress” expressed by Wotan and his self-description as the saddest of all of them (Die Walküre, act 2, scene 2); Fricka’s lament over Wotan’s faithlessness and betrayal of the laws of the gods (“With a grieving mind / I had to bear it,” act 2, scene 1); Siegmund’s mourning for Sieglinde (act 2, scene 4); the wailing of Gutrune in Götterdämmerung; and so forth. But what is above all remarkable is that Wagner’s figures break into lament whether they are divine or mortal. In this respect, Brünnhilde’s lamenting has a special position.

In Brünnhilde’s case, the lament represents an extremely complex stance, because she both hears and responds to the mortal hero’s lamenting and herself appears as someone who is lamenting. In Die Walküre, after Wotan, following Fricka’s warning, fails to realize the wish to end the gods’ “endless sadness” with the help of a mortal hero, henceforth turning against the plan he had himself set in play, Brünnhilde embodies his now isolated wish and insists on continuing with its execution. Being aware of Wotan’s split feelings, she unsuccessfully reproaches him with holding “the one thing” in her “eye” for his sake. But she gets ejected from the gods’ clan for opposing him—“From her who turned away / I have to turn away”—although she reminds him that in doing so he is rejecting a part of himself: “Must I then depart / and timidly avoid you, / then you must split / what once was embraced; / must a half of yourself / keep in distance from you, / that once was wholly your own, / you god, don’t forget this!” (act 3, scene 3).

In any event, Wotan’s plan points past his own will in Brünnhilde’s person. For what drives her forward is more than merely wishing to follow the father’s wish in the face of his forbidding of it, since in the meantime she has encountered the distress and lamenting of the mortal hero: “I heard the hero’s / solemn distress; / chiming resounded the brave man’s lament to me” (act 3, scene 3). With the wailing of the pair of human siblings Siegmund and Sieglinde in her ears, she thus resists her divine father’s will, becoming, as Wotan puts it, herself a “sad one” who now sets up a lament for her own lot (act 3, scene 3). In this way Brünnhilde’s expulsion
from the world of the gods, her becoming a mortal human being, proceeds by way of empathy. But the motif of fellow feelings in the Ring does not concern the audience’s feelings of fear and pity for the dramatic personae—hence it does not involve the theoretical version of pity grounded in Aristotle’s poetics. Instead, the relationships between the characters are framed in terms of empathy. This is one of the musical leitmotifs of Die Walküre. In the second act, Brünnhilde’s passage from the clan of the gods to the world of human beings is introduced through a metamorphosis evoked by pity. Her fellow feeling brings her quickly into a position of someone suffering by herself. The third act already shows her as a daughter lamenting the rejection by her beloved divine father.

After Sergei Eisenstein was commissioned in late 1939 to stage Die Walküre at the Bolshoi Theater, he made notes for preparing the staging between December 1939 and March 1940.31 At the center of these notes stands the theme of Brünnhilde’s pity. We find, for instance, the following entries: “At the center: Brünnhilde opens herself to human feelings” and “The only correct solution: [revealing] the human qualities in Brünnhilde.” And once more: “Only when the gods decline can a realm of humanity emerge.” But it seems to me that Eisenstein’s opposition between gods and men reveals an all-too-simple reading of the Ring. This not only because the world of the Ring cycle is populated by countless other beings alongside gods and humans: we have half-gods (Loge), Norns, giants (Fafner, Fasolt), night goblins, a dragon or Wurm, and talking birds. Beyond this, with Siegfried, an omnipotent and nearly unassailable hero appears on the scene; through Siegfried the miracle as a mythic form of the state of exception makes its mark on the action.32

Still, it seems to me that recognizing the Janus face attached to Brünnhilde’s becoming human carries even more weight; for her exile to the earthly world is by no means followed by entry into the realm of humanity. Rather, what awaits her in Götterdämmerung are intrigues, deception, violence, betrayal, and revenge—all these being elements of the Baroque mourning play as well. Through this experience, Brünnhilde—following Siegfried’s murder and her recognition of the intrigue of Gunther and Hagen, as well as the deception through which she was overpowered—becomes a person imbued with knowledge. Her final song is thus not a creaturely lament but a knowing lament: “The purest / had to betray me / so that a woman would become wise!”—a lament aware of no longer having any addressees: neither Creation nor the gods, and also no human beings. This is a lament that no longer counts on being heard from the “mighty god” to whom she for a last time turns, but who has himself long since succumbed to a curse: “Hear my lament, / mighty god! / Through his bravest deed, / such rightly desired by you, / you sacrificed him / who wrought it / to the curse which had fallen on you.” Otherwise than is the case in many dramas of martyrdom, in the end no higher court is convened at which justice and salvation are entrusted; for here the gods themselves are addressed as guilty parties. In this way Brünnhilde’s final song alternates between lament and
accusation, Klage and Anklage, an accusation of the gods: “O you, heavenly custodian / of oaths! / Turn your gaze / on my flourishing grief, / see your everlasting guilt!” This position of Brünnhilde at the end of Götterdämmerung recalls precisely the threshold situation between lament and accusation, between Creation and Last Judgment, that Benjamin described for the protagonist in his essay on Karl Kraus: “If he ever turns his back on creation, if he breaks off lamenting, it is only to file an accusation at the Last Judgment” (Selected Writings, 2:443; transl. mine).

This knowledge by Brünnhilde at the end of Götterdämmerung is not owed to an recognition in the biblical sense; she did not lose her innocence through love but through betrayal. Whereas she loses her omnipotence and the Valkyries’ knowledge during the night of love in which Siegfried liberates her from the ring of fire, she on the other hand gains her human knowledge as a “woman” as a victim of betrayal. In the end, the woman who has moved from the divine world to the earthly, human realm stands there not only as someone who has been touched by human suffering and lamenting; she has also been touched by human hands. When Linda Watson as Brünnhilde, after being overpowered by Siegfried disguised as Gunther, steps into the hall of the Gibichungs in act 2, scene 4, of Götterdämmerung, Achim Freyer has her appear as someone literally and visibly touched: her white robe is covered with numerous black handprints, traces of a palpable act of possession.

The iconography of the clothing here presents her as “touched” in the term’s double meaning—in this way countering the traditional image of the armed Valkyrie as unreachable and unempathetic. When, after Siegfried’s murder, Brünnhilde once again takes the stage at the LA Opera, then her appearance cancels out that shift through which Wagner’s final two stage directions intend to have her “shock” and “grief” transformed into “solemn exaltation” and “tender transfiguration.” The music—with or without the Valkyrie and Love motifs or the Volsung theme—reveals another perspective as well, just as the interpretation of the orchestral interlude after Siegfried’s death has to decide between the extremes of mourning music and mourning march. In Linda Watson’s interpretation, in any case, Brünnhilde’s final song suggested the lament of the Virgin—in Brünnhilde’s case, a no-longer virgin—while at the same time also evoking the song of mourning of a mother for her dead son.

This reading is tied to the question as to the Christian interpretive models that evidently made their way into an originally mainly mythic conception in the course of Wagner’s work. This also raises the question of whether the conclusion of Götterdämmerung, in which Brünnhilde transforms murdered Siegfried into the “mighty hero,” should be interpreted within the framework of a drama of martyrdom. The fact that Wagner repeatedly rewrote the final passage—we have nine extant variants between the first draft in 1848 and the first performance in 1876—does not only signal insecurity and hesitation but also the precarious status of the final development. Although the victim (Siegfried) is reinterpreted as a hero, no
Ever After beckons toward him. For the moment in which the murdered man is addressed by Brünnhilde as both hero and beloved comes together with the decline and fall of the world of the gods: “for the end of the gods is now dawning.” This signifies an absence of eschatology and a hereafter beyond the earthly world and in this way an emptying out of claims to Christian figuration—here, as well, we have an affinity with the Trauerspiel. This ending certainly does not need to be understood as an apotheosis. If, under the law of Wotan’s will and Wotan’s conflict, the drama’s time can only produce the longed-for “end” “through the detour of the dramatic process,” then Wagner’s four-part musical drama can also be understood as an allegory of life itself—which, we will recall, Freud characterized as a detour within the process of adaptation of the organic to the inorganic.

The rest is music.

Translated by Joel Golb

NOTES

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Professor Weigel is a leading European scholar of the “cultural turn” in philology. Her earliest book dealt with non-canonical genres (pamphlets in 1848, prisoner’s literature), and the relation between gender and literature. She has published extensively on various aspects of modern European literature and culture with special focus on the work of Walter Benjamin, Aby Warburg, Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, Heinrich Heine, and Ingeborg Bachmann. More recently Professor Weigel has shifted the focus of her research to the relation between science, literature and religion and to the cultural history of knowledge in general with particular interest in concepts of generation, genealogy and heredity. Other current research projects include the topography of multiple cultures in Europe with particular respect to the shift towards the East; the history of secularisation; the figure of the martyr from the perspective of cultural studies; interdisciplinary images theory.

and Mediengeschichte der Stimme (Berlin 2002, with Friedrich Kittler and Thomas Macho); Gershom Scholem, Literatur und Rhetorik (Köln et.al. 2000, with Stéphane Mosés); Trauma. Zwischen Psychoanalyse und kulturellem Deutungsmuster (Köln et.al. 1999, with Elisabeth Bronfen and Birgit R. Erde).


5. The translation of Benjamin’s book Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels as The Origin of Tragic Drama mistakes an important argument that is of special relevance for this context. In the two essays in which his theory of music emerged first, he develops it from the contrast between both Tragisches (the tragic) versus Trauer (mourning) and Tragödie (tragic drama) versus Trauerspiel (mourning play). See the third section of this article.

6. In order to address this neglect, the Zentrum für Literatur und Kulturforschung (Berlin) organized a symposium on the topic in 2010, which resulted in the volume Klang und Musik bei Walter Benjamin, ed. Tobias Robert Klein (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013). The Benjamin-Handbuch, published by Metzler in 2006, neglects Benjamin’s reflections on music entirely.


8. In section 19 of Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie oder Griechentum und Pessimismus, in Werke in sechs Bänden, vol. 1, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1980), 103ff. Schlechta reproduces the text with the title of its second edition (1886); the original edition was entitled The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872).


16. Ibid., 173.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 193.


21. It is unclear how much of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy Benjamin knew when he set down his view on tragedy and Trauerspiel in 1916. There are occasional mentions of Nietzsche in the letters and speeches of Benjamin’s student days. But Benjamin’s thinking about Nietzsche seems to have intensified only after he read the exchange of letters between Nietzsche and Overbeck. In a letter to Gershom Scholem from December 23, 1917, Benjamin talks about reading this exchange: “I am currently reading the deeply moving exchange of letters between Nietzsche and Franz Overbeck, the first real document of his life that I have come across.” Gesammelte Briefe 1:410. And only in 1919, immediately after seeing Siegfried, Benjamin read Nietzsche’s The Case of Wagner, as he reported to Ernst Schoen in a letter from January 29, 1919: “Recently we were invited to Wagner’s ‘Siegfried,’ and I instantly read Nietzsche’s The Case of Wagner afterwards, in order to be totally surprised by the simplicity and far-sightedness of what Nietzsche said. The second piece on Wagner (Nietzsche contra Wagner)
I don’t know yet, but this first one excited me immensely, which, on the whole, I can’t say for all the works of Nietzsche that I know (GB 2, 10).

22. Nietzsche, Geburt der Tragödie, xx.
23. Emphases are mine.
24. Emphases are mine.
25. This has as its basis the simultaneous origin of historicity and language as a system of meaning and communication. The phrase “history emerges simultaneously with meaning in human language” (139) refers to another essay written that year, “On Language in General and on the Language of Man,” which expands on this thought. Insofar as the becoming of language and of history is the same thing as the end of the state of nature, nature stalls out, whenever natural sound seeks expression in language.
27. Dahlhaus, Richard Wagners Musikdramen, 86.
29. Ibid., 191.
31. The premiere took place on November 21, 1941.
32. “The state of exception has for jurisprudence a meaning analogous to that which the miracle has for theology.” Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (1922; Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1990), 49. Transl. JG.